Crude Intentions: Evaluating the Growing Risks of Arctic Alaskan Oil Production by Stein, Eliot
SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad 
SIT Digital Collections 
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection SIT Study Abroad 
Spring 2020 
Crude Intentions: Evaluating the Growing Risks of Arctic Alaskan 
Oil Production 
Eliot Stein 
SIT Study Abroad 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection 
 Part of the Climate Commons, Energy Policy Commons, Environmental Health and Protection 
Commons, Environmental Studies Commons, Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, Oil, 
Gas, and Energy Commons, and the Place and Environment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stein, Eliot, "Crude Intentions: Evaluating the Growing Risks of Arctic Alaskan Oil Production" (2020). 
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. 3285. 
https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/3285 
This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital 
Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized 




Crude Intentions:  

















First, I would like to thank Dan Govoni and Alex Tyas for their support both in Iceland and the 
United States. They ensured my abbreviated time in Iceland and Finland was incredibly 
worthwhile and their continued virtual guidance made this project possible.  
 
Next, I want to thank my fellow classmates for engaging in thought-provoking conversations, 
making my experience abroad so much fun, and remaining positive in light of a global pandemic.  
 
To my family, thank you for keeping me motivated once I returned home. This time together has 




































The discovery of oil on Alaska’s North Slope in the 1920s began a century of fossil fuel 
exploration, development, and production in the Arctic region. Alaska became integral to the 
nation’s growing energy dominance. However, since 1988, oil production on the North Slope has 
been in steady decline. In 2015, Shell, followed by several other oil majors, terminated their 
Arctic Alaska operations. This past year, BP made waves by ending six decades of operations in 
Alaska. Most recently, five of the six major U.S. banks announced they would no longer finance 
Arctic oil and gas projects. This paper analyzes these decisions by evaluating the environmental, 
economic, and reputational risk of engaging in Arctic oil exploitation. A thorough review of 
existing literature demonstrates waning interest in the region’s fossil resources. Operating in and 
likely harming the pristine and fragile Arctic Alaskan ecosystem requires companies to incur 
added costs and face growing backlash that diminished potential returns can no longer justify. 
Consequently, I conclude that despite recent efforts by President Donald Trump to revive the 
region, Arctic Alaska will lose relevance for national oil production in the coming decades and 


























My research did not include any human or animal subjects. I acknowledge I am an outsider to 
Arctic Alaska having never visited the North Slope. I believe I comprehensively covered the key 
aspects of oil production in Alaska and properly cited all referenced literature. However, I offer a 
limited review of the influence oil development has had on indigenous communities on the North 
Slope. The oil industry has had profound effects, both positive and negative, on nearly all of 
Alaska, and detailing every impact is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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When the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, many Americans 
questioned the $7.2 million acquisition. Beyond the pursuit of Manifest Destiny, the largely 
unexplored expanse appeared to hold little value to the United States. ​The​ ​Holt County Sentinel 
(1867), a Missouri-based newspaper, asserted that “ninety-nine hundredths of Russian America 
[were] absolutely useless,” while the New-York Tribune declared there had not been “in the 
history of diplomacy, such insensate folly as this treaty” (Telegraph to the Tribune, 1867). A half 
a century passed before the true value of Alaska would become known. 
In 1917, Alexander Malcolm Smith became the first white man to discover oil on 
Alaska’s North Slope. Recognizing the region’s potential to source the nation’s growing oil 
needs, President Warren Harding designated over 23 million acres of Northwest Alaska as the 
fourth Naval Petroleum Reserve, later renamed the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. With 
sufficient reserves elsewhere, NPR-4 remained largely untouched and unexplored for the next 
two decades (Reed, 1958).  
World War II demonstrated the world’s budding oil dependency, bringing renewed 
interest to the Alaskan Arctic. A ten-year reconnaissance project spanning from 1944 to 1953 
revealed nine oil and gas fields within NPR-4, confirming the North Slope’s importance as an 
energy resource (Reed, 1958). While faced with many challenges due to the harsh environment, 
the exploratory mission indicated that with proper infrastructure, technology, and preparation, 
the Arctic could be developed for resource production. Accordingly, the Bureau of Land 
Management opened parts of the North Slope to leasing five years later. Several oil companies 
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bid to explore the Arctic’s fossil fuel reserves. However, NPR-4 remained closed to 
development, and in 1960, Congress further restricted exploration with the creation of the nine 
million acre Arctic National Wildlife Range (Banet, 1991). Despite indications of enormous oil 
plays, most early exploratory wells came up dry. Quickly, interest in Alaska’s resources 
dwindled. By 1967, nearly all Arctic oil and gas exploration had ceased (Banet, 1991). Most 
companies had lost millions in their fruitless pursuit of oil and were ready to move on. Then, in 
January of 1968, the discovery of oil at Prudhoe Bay changed the course of history for the state 
of Alaska. 
Upon its discovery, Prudhoe Bay was easily the largest oil field in North America. 25 
billion barrels of oil, over half of which represent conventionally recoverable resources, lay 
underneath its subsurface (Lasley, 2005). The discovery brought oil companies racing back to 
Alaska. 33 new exploratory wells were completed in 1969, and the next BLM lease sale brought 
in $900 million in bids, up from a meager $6.1 million in 1965 (Lasley, 2005). The sudden 
increase in activity uncovered several more fields, including what had been North America’s 
second largest oil field, the Kuparuk River oil field. Yet, without a means of transportation, the 
oil remained in the ground. 
Construction on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System began in 1974, connecting Arctic oil 
to the global market. Three years later, crude oil from Prudhoe Bay flowed 800 miles south 
across three mountain ranges to Valdez, Alaska (Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 2019). 
Throughout the next decade, the pipeline operated at full capacity. New discoveries and high oil 
prices fueled steadily increasing production, and several oil companies began exploring oil 
prospects on the outer-continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea (Lasley, 2005).  
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While exploration and production grew, as did efforts to protect the Arctic environment. 
In 1980, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act more than doubled the size of 
Arctic National Wildlife Range and renamed the protected area the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge. However, ANILCA also opened a portion of the refuge up for natural resource 
exploration. Section 1002 of the act provided for an analysis of the environmental impacts of oil 
and gas extraction and allowed exploratory activity on the surface of the refuge’s 1.5 million acre 
Coastal Plain, also known as the 1002 Area. Any development with the intent to produce oil and 
gas remained strictly prohibited (​Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act​, 1980). In 
1986, Chevron and BP drilled the only well in the 1002 Area to date. The results of the project 
have remained confidential for over three decades, although a recent New York Times 
investigative report found that the discovery was likely worthless (Eder & Fountain, 2019). 
Opening up the ANWR to drilling has been a source of debate for many years, but no 
development has occurred in the Refuge since 1986. 
 





North Slope oil production peaked in the late 1980s, steadily declining since then. In 
1988, the North Slope produced nearly two million barrels of oil per day (Figure 1). The region 
alone brought more oil to market than any state other than Texas, helping make Alaska the top 
producing state in the country (Figure 8). However, oil prices deteriorated in the latter part of the 
1980s, causing a decline in oil production nationwide. While other states have benefitted from 
the discovery of new reserves and the implementation of new technologies, Alaska has not been 
as lucky. Last year, Alaska fell to sixth in oil production, with a record low of 451,000 barrels of 
oil produced per day (Figure 1).  
Despite the region’s declining production, the North Slope and OCS remained of key 
interest to oil companies for the remainder of the 20th century. Exploration for oil has continued 
with varied success both onshore and offshore and in federal and state waters. BP and 
ConocoPhillips emerged as the two major players in the region, but several other companies 
have remained invested in the Arctic. Shell led the early charge in offshore exploration, but they 
failed to make any profitable discoveries and closed their Alaska offices in 1991 (Rosen, 2015). 
A minor breakthrough occurred in 1994 when ARCO Alaska, which later became part of 
ConocoPhillips, announced the discovery of the Alpine oil field near the western boundary of the 
NPRA. The discovery of a major oil field outside of Prudhoe Bay, along with recovering oil 
prices toward the end of the 20th century, once again brought oil companies back to the Arctic 
(Lasley, 2005). Following the success at Alpine, the BLM opened up the NPRA for exploration 
in 1999. North Slope oil production briefly stabilized in the 2000s, and high oil prices set oil 
exploration in Arctic Alaska up for another, perhaps final, surge. 
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Shell returned to the Alaskan Arctic in 2005 to lead a new round of offshore oil 
exploration. In 2005 and 2007, oil companies spent nearly $90 million on Beaufort Sea leases, 
with Shell accounting for $83.5 million (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2020). In 2008, 
oil companies set a new record for offshore lease spending, with high bids totalling over $2.6 
billion (Minerals Management Service, 2008). Shell acquired the vast majority of the leases, 
spending $2.1 billion (Rosen, 2015). Despite the massive spending, a lone exploratory well 
would be completed between 2005 and 2015. Shell’s second venture into the Arctic Alaskan seas 
proved disastrous. Inadequate preparation for the possibility of an oil spill or the severe 
environment caused several delays, and in 2012, Shell’s floating oil rig, the ​Kulluk​, ran aground 
in the Gulf of Alaska on its return from the Arctic (Funk, 2014). Finally, in 2015, Shell 
announced they would be terminating all activity in Alaska. By 2016, nearly every company 
exploring the Arctic OCS had also relinquished their leases (Dlouhy, 2016).  
President Trump attempted to reignite interest in the region by opening up the ANWR to 
leasing in 2017, but only a few companies continue to operate in Alaska. In 2019, BP, which had 
until recently accounted for two-thirds of the state’s oil production, announced the sale of all of 
their assets in Alaska. BP’s decision ended their nearly six decades of operations on the North 
Slope (BP, 2019). Five of the six major U.S. banks have also sworn off of the Arctic, promising 
to no longer finance new oil and gas projects in the region.  
Oil companies have backed out of Alaska several times throughout the state’s production 
history only to return when market conditions improved. However, this most recent retreat may 
have been the last. An increasingly fragile ecosystem, weakened Arctic oil market, and 
passionate environmental movement threaten the long term viability of oil production in the 
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state. In the context of growing environmental, economic, and reputational risk, this paper 
analyzes the recent changes to Alaska’s oil industry, concluding that as global oil demand wanes, 




The following pages discuss why the many risks associated with oil production in Alaska 
may no longer be worth the reward. I begin by characterizing the current situation for Arctic oil 
and gas exploration, development, and production. Drawing from company press releases and 
newspaper articles, I present recent decisions by oil companies and banks to distance themselves 
from the Arctic. In contrast, I detail the remaining oil and gas activity in the region and explain 
efforts by the federal government to open the ANWR and OCS to exploration. 
The discussion section of my paper analyzes why these decisions were made. First, I 
consider the unique environmental challenges associated with drilling for oil and gas in the 
Arctic. By consulting existing studies of the Arctic Alaska environment and ecosystem, oil spill 
risk and response feasibility assessments, and research on Arctic climate change and its impact 
on oil production, I demonstrate the costly challenges of operating in the Arctic Circle. Second, I 
describe the financial challenges for Arctic Alaskan oil projects. I utilize various analyses to 
explain the added monetary costs of environmental risk, compare the cost and timing of oil 
projects in multiple locations throughout the United States, and estimate economically 
recoverable oil and gas resources at different oil prices. In addition, using press releases, 
interviews of financial analysts, and newspaper articles, I assess and speculate about the impact 
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of the decisions by banks to no longer finance Arctic oil projects. Finally, I turn to journal and 
news articles to consider the role of reputational risk in preventing further Alaskan oil 
development. 
I conclude by asserting why these environmental, economic, and reputational challenges 
will prevent further development in Arctic Alaska. State, federal, and global energy projections 
strengthen my argument. In addition, I contemplate the impact a political shift at the federal level 




The Arctic Alaska Petroleum Province encompasses most of Northern Alaska. The 
province extends north from the northern margin of the Brooks Range to the edge of the 
continental shelf in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, west to the offshore border with Russia, and 
east to the Canadian border (Bird & Houseknecht, 2011). The area includes the majority of the 
North Slope Borough, the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska, and the Coastal Plain of the 
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Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. The province’s underlying geology makes the area ideal for oil 
and gas formation. Sandstone reservoir rocks lie above shale source rocks and below 
stratigraphic marine shale traps. Nearly every sandstone unit in the province contains oil and or 
gas (Bird & Houseknecht, 2011). 
The entire Arctic region contains immense untapped oil and gas resources. 
Approximately 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil and 30 percent of the 
undiscovered conventional gas may lie in the Arctic (Gautier et al., 2009). Of the nearly 90 
Bbbls of oil estimated in the Arctic, one third likely exists in Arctic Alaska, by far the most for 
any Arctic province. Further, 13 percent of the Arctic’s 1,669 tcf of gas lies in Arctic Alaska 
(Gautier et al., 2008). 
Most of Alaska’s oil and gas resources formed underneath the ocean floor in the Beaufort 
and Chukchi Seas or along the Arctic coast. Additional significant accumulations exist in the 
1002 Area and NPRA. A Bureau of Ocean Energy Management resource assessment estimated 
that over 23 billion of the approximately 30 Bbbls of undiscovered oil and half of the 
undiscovered natural gas in Arctic Alaska lies on Alaska’s OCS. The Chukchi Sea contains an 
estimated 15.38 Bbbls of oil and 76.77 tcf of natural gas, while the Beaufort Sea contains an 
estimated 8.22 Bbbls of oil and 27.64 tcf of gas (Lasco, 2017). According to a 1998 USGS 
assessment, the 1002 Area likely contains 7.7 Bbbls of oil, and nearly all of the oil accumulates 
in the western third of the region (Bird et al., 1998). Finally, the NPRA contains just under 1 








Shell’s decision to suspend its offshore drilling program in Alaska in September 2015 
shocked many. After years of championing the Chukchi Sea’s ample oil and gas resources and 
weathering multiple near disasters and legal obstacles, they abruptly closed their operations. 
Shell had spent nearly $8 billion on exploration and left without producing a single barrel of oil 
(Dlouhy, 2016). The company’s press release cited “indications of oil and gas… not sufficient to 
warrant further exploration” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015). The high costs of the project along with 
the strict regulatory process contributed to the decision to cease exploratory drilling for the 
“foreseeable future” (Royal Dutch Shell, 2015).  
Witnessing Shell’s many struggles, every other company with holdings in the Chukchi 
Sea relinquished their leases, leaving a handful of tracts in the Beaufort Sea representing the only 
active leases in the OCS. In 2013, at the height of Shell’s debacle, ConocoPhillips, Alaska’s 
largest oil producer, paused their offshore exploratory program. The company blamed unclear 
federal regulations (Lefebvre & Fowler, 2013). In 2016, ConocoPhillips decided to cede all 61 of 
their leases in the sea, determining they no longer represented competitive investments 
(ConocoPhillips, n.d.). Similarly, in 2015, Statoil, now Equinor, determined their offshore 
holdings were no longer competitive and abandoned all of their claims in Alaska (Equinor, 
2015). Total also chose to rule out further exploration in the Arctic ice pack due to high costs. 
The decision came as a broader move by Total toward a more diverse and clean energy portfolio 
(Total, 2017). Repsol, Iona Energy, Eni, Encana, and Armstrong Energy also ended their work in 
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the Chukchi Sea in either 2015 or 2016 (Dlouhy, 2016). Today, of the 694 leases awarded in the 
2005, 2007, and 2008 sales, 11 remain active, all in the Beaufort Sea (Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, 2020). President Barack Obama closed the door on further developments in the 
Arctic OCS in 2016, banning leasing in nearly all federally owned Arctic waters (Davenport, 
2016). 
The election of Donald Trump represented a potential change in tune for oil exploration 
in the Arctic. He quickly went to work attempting to undo Obama’s lease ban through an 
executive order. However, an Alaskan judge ruled President Trump’s reversal was unlawful last 
year (Eilperin, 2019). To date, Arctic offshore leasing remains illegal. The president also opened 
up the 1002 Area to leasing in his 2017 tax reform. The act required two federal lease sales in the 
ANWR by 2027 and allowed for up to 2,000 acres of surface development (Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act, 2017). The BLM’s subsequent environmental impact assessment recommended opening up 
the entire Coastal Plan for leasing, the most lenient plan proposed in terms of environmental 
protection (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2019). The report acknowledges that the decision 
will result in unavoidable and likely long-term ecological impacts, including habitat losses, 
migration pattern disturbances, and subsistence resource decreases (U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 2019).  
While many large oil companies had left Alaska by 2016, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, 
Eni, Repsol, Hilcorp, and a few smaller Alaskan companies remain invested in the region. Last 
year, Eni completed an exploratory well at Spy Island, the first completed offshore well since 
Shell’s in 2015, and the first in the Beaufort Sea since 2003 (Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, 2019). The well’s development comes as part of the company’s expansion in 
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Alaska over the past several years in which they have acquired 124 new exploratory leases and 
stakes in existing oil fields. CEO of Eni Claudio Descalzi called Alaska a “main target” for the 
company (Stricker, 2019). Meanwhile, in 2017, Repsol announced a 1.2 Bbbl discovery on the 
North Slope, the largest conventional onshore oil discovery in 30 years. They expect production 
of the massive oil field to begin next year (Repsol, 2017). Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska hoped 
that the find could “usher in a new renaissance for economic growth” in Alaska (2017). Hilcorp 
has also initiated plans for increased production, as BOEM approved their plans for the Liberty 
Project, the first offshore production site in the federal waters of Alaska, in late 2018 (U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 2018). The moves by these companies to increase their stakes in 
Alaska are not necessarily surprising, as smaller companies will often take on increased risk and 
cut costs to try to revive dwindling reservoirs.  
In August 2019, BP, historically one of the largest producers in the region, decided they 
were not willing to shoulder the risk of operating in the Arctic. In BP’s press release, CEO Bob 
Dudley explained that their projects in Alaska no longer aligned with their long-term business 
strategy nor did they represent competitive investments (BP, 2019). Hilcorp bought all of BP’s 
Alaska assets, making them the second largest producer in the state. ConocoPhillips and Hilcorp 
now control 72 percent of the state’s production. Wood Mackenzie analyst Rowena Gunn 
predicted ExxonMobil, the state’s third largest producer, would soon follow BP (Wood 
Mackenzie, 2019). ExxonMobil, however, seems to have focused their interest on natural gas on 
the North Slope. The company has invested $4 billion into their Point Thomson reservoir just 
west of the Coastal Plain. The project marks a “new era” for ExxonMobil in Alaska, as they have 
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laid the “foundation for future gas development” (ExxonMobil, 2018). As the world begins to 
embrace cleaner energy, perhaps Alaska’s future could hinge upon gas, not oil, production. 
Even with ExxonMobil’s moves, nearly every major U.S. bank and over a dozen foreign 
banks have followed BP’s lead to move out of the state. JPMorgan Chase, Citi, Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley have each announced within the last six months that they 
would no longer finance new oil and gas development in the Arctic, including within the 
ANWR. However, these decisions still allow the companies to aid in Arctic transactions and 
fund existing projects. The announcements largely came as part of larger scale environmental 
policy alterations. Bank of America stands as the only major U.S. bank willing to finance new 
Arctic oil and gas projects (Bank of America, 2019). Without a clear source of financing and 





The decisions by oil majors and banks to end their work in the Arctic were carefully 
researched and planned maneuvers. The companies aimed to reduce their exposure to risk in 
three interconnected areas: the environment, the economy, and their reputation. In the following 
sections I will investigate these three risk areas and demonstrate why, when considered 









Arctic Alaska contains large oil and gas resources, but the harsh and remote environment 
creates unique challenges for their exploration and production. For nearly half of the year, 
temperatures rarely reach above freezing, plunging as low as -50ºC at times, while in the 
Summer, they hover just above 0ºC. Near complete darkness shrouds the region for two months 
of the year, and sea ice covers the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas for another eight to nine. High 
winds, thick fog, and large waves are common as well (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). These 
challenges slow down operations, decrease total operating time, and create additional risks for all 
Arctic oil and gas procedures. 
Resource development also inevitably has several negative impacts on the diverse and 
fragile Arctic ecosystem. Construction of roads, buildings, and other infrastructure associated 
with oil production can cause more rapid permafrost melting, harm or kill tundra vegetation, and 
contaminate water sources. Offshore and onshore development also encroaches upon and alters 
the habitats of marine and terrestrial animals, including polar bears, bowhead whales, seals, 
caribou, and numerous birds and fish species (National Research Council, 2003). Possible oil and 
gas activities on the Coastal Plain have received special attention for the impact they will have 
on the Porcupine caribou herd, the largest and one of the healthiest caribou herds in North 
America. The herd lives primarily in the ANWR and utilizes the Coastal Plain for calving. They 
are also a key subsistence resource for indigenous people on the North Slope (Cornwall, 2017). 
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A recent vulnerability analysis of the herd predicts that the risk of population decline increases 
over the next ten years with the introduction of oil and gas activities in the refuge, potentially 
requiring severe hunting restrictions (Russell & Gunn, 2019). The BLM’s Coastal Plain 
environmental impact assessment requires suspending construction activities for a month during 
calving season. The assessment also requires various environmental studies and implements 
additional restrictions to protect ecosystems (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2019). While 
significantly weaker than necessary for proper environmental protection, these measures add 
more costly and time-consuming hurdles for companies in their pursuit of oil. 
Climate change serves to further complicate oil and gas development on Alaska’s North 
Slope and OCS. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that the last five 
years have successively set new records for warmest annual mean Arctic temperature. The 2016 
and 2018 mean winter temperature anomalies more than doubled previous records (2019). 
Relatedly, maximum Arctic sea ice extent reached new lows every year between 2015 and 2019, 
and multiyear ice has exhibited a 60 percent loss in extent since the 1980s (Overland et al., 
2019). The largest sea ice losses have come in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas (National 
Research Council, 2014). With a summer sea-ice free Arctic projected for the end of the century 
and the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas already experiencing several ice-free summer months, Arctic 
offshore oil resources may become more accessible (National Snow and Ice Data Center, 2019). 
However, the loss of sea ice may in fact be more harmful than helpful to Arctic Alaskan 
operations. The associated rise in wave and iceberg-caused damage would increase production 
costs (Petrick et al., 2017). Further, most oil and gas operations occur in the middle of winter 
when the Arctic ecosystem is most stable. Due to the rising temperatures and loss of sea ice, the 
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Arctic winter operating window has steadily decreased over the last 25 years (Lilly, 2017). Ice 
roads take longer to construct and melt earlier, while thawing permafrost has the potential to 
damage the already limited infrastructure (Berman & Schmidt, 2019). An estimated 550km of 
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System are also at risk (Hjort et al., 2018). These climate-related 
operational impacts all result in greater costs to oil and gas companies. Updating North Slope 
roads from ice to gravel would cost an estimated $10 to $20 million annually (Berman & 
Schmidt, 2019). Melvin et al. (2017) projected climate change could cause between $100 and 
$300 million in damages to North Slope public infrastructure under both the RCP8.5 and RCP4.5 
emission scenarios. An analysis has not been conducted for oil and gas infrastructure, but the 
costs would likely be in a similar range. Perhaps of lesser concern to companies now, as 
warming continues into the future, climate change-related costs will only grow. Oil companies 
will be forced to adapt their operations to the rapidly changing environment, an added layer of 
difficulty they may increasingly be unwilling to endure. 
Taken together, the harsh environment, unique ecosystem, and impacts of climate 
change, foreshadow serious ramifications for an accident in the region. An oil spill presents 
perhaps the most likely and most damaging of consequences. While many of the causes of oil 
spills are universal across drilling locations, the likelihood of any one of them occurring off the 
coast of northern Alaska is higher than anywhere else in the United States. The Arctic’s extreme 
low temperatures and constrained daylight increase the likelihood of an oil spill due to 
equipment or mechanical failure or human error (ABSG Consulting Inc., 2018). Further, the lack 
of infrastructure makes a spill due to some operational impact more likely. Procedures typically 
completed on or by permanent stable structures are carried out by vessels instead (ABSG 
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Consulting Inc., 2018). Additionally, drilling for oil in the Arctic brings on another set of causal 
factors. Sea ice may puncture a ship’s hull or damage an oil platform. Sufficiently thick sea ice 
also may gauge the seafloor and damage a pipeline. In Hilcorp’s production plan for the Liberty 
Project, they were required to prepare for 100 and 1,000 year sea ice gauge depths (ABSG 
Consulting Inc., 2018). As previously discussed, climate change has caused rapid shifts in the 
region which increase the likelihood of spills. Permafrost thaw and subsequent land subsistence 
could cause pipeline spills (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). Increased access to the Arctic due 
to the loss of sea ice may result in greater interference in the region, yet stakeholders remain 
largely unprepared to manage the associated risks. 
Responding to an oil spill in the Arctic also proves harder than anywhere else in the 
world. Several knowledge gaps exist in ensuring safe operations. Limited research has been 
conducted regarding interactions between oil and ice, the feasibility of typical detection and 
response strategies in the Arctic, or the distribution of Arctic wildlife (National Research 
Council, 2014). Employing existing mitigation strategies in the Arctic would likely not be 
possible for significant portions of the year. Two figures from the Pew Charitable Trust’s report 
on Arctic OCS oil spill responses illustrate the environmental barrier well: 
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Figure 4. Percentage of time when operating limits for response are reached due to several 
environmental conditions. Figure 5. Impacts of environmental conditions on the feasibility of 
various oil spill response strategies. 
 
Overall, all oil response strategies would face some level of difficulty all year round, with 
several strategies rendered completely ineffective at times. Even if a response were possible, the 
North Slope’s remote location implies that emergency responders would take hours or days to 
arrive. The Arctic has no major highways or ports and only two airports with the capacity to 
handle cargo planes. In fact, the nearest U.S. Air Base is 950 miles away from the Arctic coast in 
Kodiak, Alaska, while the closest major port is 1,300 miles away at Dutch Harbor (The Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2013). A report from the National Research Council (2014) suggests that the 
United States Coast Guard may not be fully prepared for a spill. The USCG in Alaska lacks the 
necessary personnel, equipment, transportation, communication, navigation, and safety 
resources. More locally, the North Slope’s minimal onshore infrastructure and satellite coverage 
would likely hinder response coordination (ABSG Consulting Inc., 2018). There are few oil spill 
equipment caches on the North Slope, and building the necessary physical infrastructure and 
training a sufficient number of onsite personnel would almost certainly require a major 
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investment from the federal and state government and oil companies (National Research 
Council, 2014).  
Reviewing the Exxon Valdez disaster offers a worrisome baseline for the potential 
impacts of an oil spill on the Alaskan Arctic ecosystem. When the Exxon Valdez ran aground in 
1989, approximately 262,000 barrels of oil were spilled into Southern Alaska’s Prince William 
Sound. Four hours passed and nearly 170,000 barrels spilled before the Coast Guard arrived, and 
a severe storm over the next several days prevented responders from initiating proper mitigation 
procedures. All told, the clean up required 10,000 workers, 1,000 boats, and 100 aircrafts. 
Despite a valiant clean up effort, pockets of oil can still be found along the coastline (Shigenaka, 
2014). The alarmingly limited infrastructure in northern Alaska could not accommodate such a 
large response operation, while the notably harsher environment would jeopardize the safety of 
emergency personnel. According to a BOEM study, BP spent $4.2 billion, or $16,000 per barrel, 
on containing and cleaning up the Exxon Valdez spill. With no basis for which to quantify the 
cost per barrel of a spill in the Arctic, BOEM sets a range between $5,100, the cost per barrel of 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and $16,000 per barrel (Industrial Economics, Inc. & SC&A, 
Inc., 2015). Given the many uncertainties surrounding Arctic oil spill response, $16,000 per 
barrel seems like a more realistic cost estimate, with the potential to be much higher. 
Consequently, the total clean up cost for a major spill in the Arctic would likely amount to 
several billion dollars. 
Yet, the response costs do not encompass the entire impact of an oil spill. An estimated 
250,000 seabirds, 2,800 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald eagles, 22 killer whales, and 
billions of salmon and herring eggs were killed as a result of the Exxon Valdez’s grounding. The 
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Prince William Sound ecosystem has still not recovered (Shigenaka, 2014). BP paid $1.1 billion, 
or $4,200 per barrel, to compensate for the damage to ecological resources (Industrial 
Economics, Inc. & SC&A, Inc., 2015). The effects of a spill on the Arctic ecosystem would be 
considerably larger. The BOEM study suggests that an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea would have a 
35 percent greater ecological impact than that of a spill in Cook Inlet, which lies just west of 
Prince William Sound, while a spill in the Chukchi Sea would have a 130 percent greater impact 
(Industrial Economics, Inc. & SC&A, Inc., 2015). Relatedly, the Arctic seas have demonstrated 
limited resiliency to high mortality events such as an oil spill (Dvorak, 2017). Ultimately, an oil 
spill could devastate an ecosystem already altered by the changing climate. Using Cook Inlet as a 
baseline, BOEM’s study calculates the ecological cost of a spill in the Arctic at between $2,500 
and $9,700/per barrel (Industrial Economics, Inc. & SC&A, Inc., 2015). As a result, an oil 
company may have to pay upwards of $2.5 billion to compensate for damages. The actual cost 
could be much higher given the Alaskan Arctic likely would never recover from a major oil spill.  
Putting a price on the complete destruction of an ecosystem is a nearly impossible and 
perhaps unethical task. However, two studies have attempted to appraise Alaska’s ecosystems 
using a U.S. citizen “willingness-to-pay” metric. A University of Alaska-Anchorage study 
estimated the total value of all of Alaska’s ecosystems at $29.7 billion in 2001 dollars, or $43 
billion today (Colt, 2001). The Alaska Department of Fish and Game denotes eight unique 
ecosystems in Alaska. Determining the value of one ecosystem over another presents an ethical 
dilemma, and thus, I divided the $43 billion equally between the eight. Consequently, the Arctic 
sea ice ecosystem could be valued at $5.4 billion. Carson et al. (2003) presented an alternative 
valuation, estimating the mean willingness to pay to avoid a second Exxon Valdez oil spill to be 
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$7.2 billion in 2003 dollars, equivalent to $10 billion today. A previous study conducted by 
Carson et al. suggested a high bound for willingness to pay of approximately $15 billion, or 
$25.5 billion today (Dvorak, 2017). Given the vulnerability and pristine nature of the Arctic 
OCS, the ecosystem value is likely closer to the high bound. When compared to 
ConocoPhillips’s net income of $7.2 billion for 2019, the risk becomes quite clear (Brehmer, 
2020). While an oil company would almost certainly not be required to pay the entire value of 




The many serious environmental risks associated with exploring for, developing, and 
producing oil in the Arctic translates into oil companies taking on a greater financial burden than 
for a project anywhere else in the world. As discussed, the harsh yet threatened environment, 
limited infrastructure, restricted operating time, and remote location require a willingness to take 
on considerable economic and technical risk. Arctic oil projects require large capital 
commitments in which any return is at least a decade away and extended project management 
characterized by complex engineering. (Pugliaresi, 2013). Without either, embarking on a new 
Arctic venture simply is not feasible. By comparing various cost and time metrics to other U.S. 
oil fields, the drawbacks of Arctic oil production both in the present and future become clear. 
First, the lead time to production for an Arctic well is orders of magnitude higher than for 
wells elsewhere in the United States, most notably in tight oil fields. The U.S. Energy 
Information Agency projects that bringing an oil well in the ANWR into production, factoring in 
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the lease, exploration, and development processes, would take at least a decade (2018). Yet, 
Shell’s debacle in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas indicate the process could take much longer. 
Their ten year stint in the OCS only included leasing and unfinished exploration. To get to 
production, Shell may have required another costly decade. A tight oil well, which utilizes 
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling practices, on the other hand, takes only months to 
plan, drill, and complete (Kleinberg et al., 2018). Even on a relatively fast ten-year timescale, an 
oil company could complete at least 20, and likely upwards of 60, tight oil wells before 
completing the one Arctic well. The drawn out lead time adds to the already more expensive 
initial cost of drilling in Alaska. A New York Times article estimated that drilling one well in 
Alaska costs $30 to $50 million, five times the cost of a shale well (McFarlane & Olson, 2019).  
Incredibly high lifetime costs and decade-long lead times require low enough breakeven 
points to justify commencing an Arctic oil project. Yet, few, if any, projects in Alaska’s OCS 
exhibit the necessary economic conditions to drill. Comparing the undiscovered economically 
recoverable oil in various places in the United States clearly illustrates the high profitability 
threshold for Alaskan production. Despite the estimated 23.6 Bbbls of oil in the Chukchi and 
Beaufort Seas combined, the total economically recoverable oil is negligible at low oil prices 
(Lasco, 2017). A BOEM study (2016) indicates that no recoverable oil occurs in the Chukchi Sea 
at $30/barrel, while a mere 70 MMbbls occurs in the Beaufort Sea. For comparison, BOEM 
estimates at least 3 Bbbls of recoverable oil anywhere else along the United States’ OCS, 
including along the Atlantic and Pacific OCS where significantly less oil exists. Of the nearly 50 
Bbbls of undiscovered technically recoverable oil in the Gulf of Mexico, over 31 Bbbls are 
recoverable at $30/barrel. The Chukchi and Beaufort Seas combined finally surpass the Atlantic 
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and Pacific OCS at $60/barrel. However, exploiting three quarters of the Arctic OCS technically 
recoverable oil would remain economically infeasible (Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 
2016). Producing solely the Chukchi Sea oil at $60/barrel would cost $72.9 billion and create net 
benefits totalling a slim $6.2 billion (Dvorak, 2017). The profit generated in the Gulf of Mexico 
due to the lower cost of production and much higher quantity of oil would dwarf that of Alaska’s 
Arctic seas. Consequently, even if oil prices were to consistently reach heights where companies 
could turn a profit in the Arctic, other locations, both onshore and offshore, would offer better 
prospects. In looking elsewhere, oil companies incorporate less risk into their operations both 
economically and environmentally. 
 
 
Figure 6. Daily WTI spot prices from 1986 to 2020 (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2020b) 
 
Alaskan oil’s dependency on consistently high oil prices makes projecting profitability 
nearly impossible. Any estimate of future oil prices incorporates a significant amount of 
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uncertainty, especially when attempting to forecast over a decade out. As a result, oil companies 
should only tap the most productive of resources (Kleinberg et al., 2018). Even then, profit is not 
guaranteed. When Shell and others bid billions on Chukchi and Beaufort Sea leases in the 
mid-2000s, oil prices were consistently over $70/barrel, reaching a high of $140/barrel in late 
June of 2008 (Figure 6). The promise of considerable revenue justified their lease bids and initial 
costs. Shell was willing to endure setbacks and delays as oil prices remained between $80 and 
$100/barrel for most of the early 2010s (Figure 6). However, oil prices plummeted from late 
2014 to early 2016. When Shell relinquished their leases in September 2015, oil was trading for 
$45/barrel (Figure 6). Dvorak estimated at $40/barrel, production of Chukchi Sea oil would 
generate a net loss of $1.9 billion (2017). No oil company saw benefit in further project 





Heavy reliance on oil prices further distinguishes Arctic oil from tight oil in the 
contiguous United States. Conventional wells such as those drilled in Prudhoe Bay and other 
massive North Slope oil fields stay in use for decades (Figure 7). Since production costs remain 
high throughout a well’s lifetime, in order to ensure continued profitability so too must oil prices. 
In contrast, tight oil wells, such as those drilled in North Dakota and Montana’s Bakken 
Formation, rapidly decline, only producing meaningful amounts of oil for a couple of years. A 
typical tight oil well will decline by 60 percent in the first year and 25 percent in the second 
(Kleinberg et al., 2018). Added to the short time for well completion, a company may cap a tight 
oil well two or three years after commencing the drilling process. Consequently, tight oil wells 
are less vulnerable to fluctuations in price. The ability to quickly add to or decrease oil supply 
offers U.S. tight oil the additional advantage of influencing oil prices while Arctic oil falls victim 
to them (Kleinberg et al., 2018). Since the price drop in 2014, oil prices have rarely been 
sufficiently high to warrant offshore drilling in the Arctic, and the North Slope’s oil production 
has continued to decline. Meanwhile, states with tight oil accumulations have experienced 
sustained production booms throughout the last decade (Figure 8).  
Recognizing the high level of environmental and economic risk, banks have made smart 
economic decisions in no longer financing new Arctic oil and gas projects. Touted as part of 
stronger environmental policies, in reality the commitments mean banks no longer believe they 
can turn a profit in Alaska. As Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon explained in an op-ed 
released alongside their recent sustainability guideline changes, “profitability will always matter” 
(2019). However, as the world demands greater sustainability, many fossil fuel ventures no 
longer appeal to investors. Unsurprisingly, the recent announcements have come alongside 
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commitments to no longer finance much of the coal industry, which has also been in decline for 
over a decade (JPMorgan Chase, 2020; Morgan Stanley, 2020; Wells Fargo, 2020; Citi, 2020). 
Banks came to these resolutions relatively easily. With lower oil prices and increased 
environmental awareness, Arctic oil no longer represents “a top ten oil project to finance,” 
according to Eurasia Group senior analyst David Livingston. Further, Livingston calls the 
decisions a “lagging indicator” of Arctic oil’s declining importance (Geman & Harder, 2020).  
While not indicative of a sharp turn toward environmentalism, the new investment 
policies still will have an impact on the Arctic. The region’s production likely will face a more 
rapid fall without key sources of financing. Oil companies will have a harder time investing in 
new projects, especially smaller companies such as Hilcorp (Dlouhy, 2020). More specifically, 
the commitments could quell interest in the Coastal Plain’s oil and gas resources. Goldman 
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo each indicate in their updated 
environmental policies that by refusing to finance new Arctic oil projects they will not aid in any 
development in the Arctic Refuge. The distinction looms large as President Trump continues to 
push for a lease sale. Contrary to the Arctic OCS, development in the 1002 Area could produce 
large net benefits even at somewhat lower oil prices. Kotchen and Burger (2007) estimate 7.07 
Bbbls of economically recoverable oil, nearly all of the 7.7 Bbbls in the Coastal Plain, with 
prices at $53/barrel, resulting in net benefits totalling $251 billion. Hahn and Passell (2010) 
similarly predict net benefits of $203 billion for oil valued at $50/barrel. Without a key source of 







In addition to the loss of financial support from banks, developing the ANWR for oil has 
potentially severe reputational ramifications. The ANWR, as with the Arctic OCS, holds value 
for simply existing. In his 1967 paper entitled ​Conservation Reconsidered​, John Krutilla argued 
that “there are many persons who obtain satisfaction from mere knowledge that part of the 
wilderness of North America remains even though they would be appalled by the prospect of 
being exposed to it” (p.781). The contamination of the largest protected terrestrial area in the 
United States would not sit well with most Americans. A 2019 Yale University poll indicated 
that 67 percent of registered voters oppose drilling in the ANWR. While Democrats 
overwhelmingly opposed drilling, 50 percent of Republicans also would prefer to leave the 
landscape undisturbed, demonstrating the Arctic Refuge’s value to all Americans (Ballew et al., 
2019). Relatedly, in 2018, institutional investors with assets totally over $2.5 trillion, including 
groups varying from BNP Paribas, to the New York State Common Retirement Fund, to The 
Episcopal Church, penned an open letter to oil and gas companies and banks urging them to not 
pursue development in the refuge (Brown, 2018). Ignoring these requests would represent a 
complete disregard for the environment and the indigenous communities that rely on the refuge’s 
resources. Of course, oil companies and the United States government are no strangers to 
abusing the planet or native people. 
Oil companies and banks have cited purely economic reasons for ending Arctic 
operations, but there is reason to believe growing public opposition also played a role. In Wells 
Fargo’s press release regarding Arctic financing, they stated they did not believe in “[limiting] 
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credit or financing to legally operating companies based solely on public opposition” (2020). 
However, they accounted for both reputational risk and social and environmental considerations 
when making the decision. The mere necessity for banks to update their environmental policies 
and angle toward more sustainable practices sheds light on the influence of greater public 
recognition of environmental issues. Shell’s Arctic operations were met with relentless 
opposition from activists. The robust and well-organized “Shell No” campaign used every means 
they could to inconvenience Shell and bring awareness to the risks of drilling in the Arctic 
(Schuler, 2019). While there may not be a way to determine the activists’ exact influence, other 
oil companies surely followed Shell’s struggles and chose not to continue with their equally 
contentious endeavours. Tainting one of the last pristine places in the nation and one of the most 




In my paper I outlined Alaska’s controversial history of oil exploitation. I detailed 
production in the North Slope and OCS, highlighting key moments in the region’s development. 
I explained the recent decisions by oil companies and banks to distance themselves from the 
Arctic by analyzing the environmental, economic, and reputational risk factors associated with 
drilling for oil and demonstrated that, despite the ample fossil resources, the limited potential 
benefits do not justify their production.  
The decisions are indicative of the Alaskan oil industry’s extended decline. In 2017, the 
Alaskan government projected that without new additions to the sector, another 120,000 barrels 
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per day of oil production could be lost by 2026. New projects such as the development of 
Repsol’s large Horseshoe discovery and the approval of the Liberty oil field would only serve to 
prolong the decline by a few decades (Munisteri, 2017). The EIA similarly views these new 
projects, along with production in the ANWR, as the state’s last lifeline. They predict new 
production in the NPRA and Arctic Refuge would only delay a return to a steady decline until 
2041. However, the EIA’s low oil price projection sees no development occurring in the ANWR, 
sending the state’s oil production to near irrelevance on a national scale much sooner (U.S. 
Energy Information Agency, 2020d). Further, as oil stops flowing, continuing to operate TAPS 
will become a greater economic and technical challenge, putting greater strain on the already 
faltering industry. With a minimum operating capacity estimated somewhere between 75,000 
and 350,000 barrels per day, the pipeline could hit the threshold as early as 2025 (Munisteri, 
2017). Lacking a means of transportation and failing to turn a profit, the once backbone of 
national energy production could cease producing oil in a matter of years. 
The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook and the recent collapse of the 
oil market offer little hope for a revival of the Alaskan oil industry. Echoing the EIA’s 
projection, the IEA sees U.S. tight oil not only dominating the country’s production but also 
spurring any growth globally for the next few decades (IEA, 2019). The cheaper and more 
readily exploited oil should continue to pull interest away from the Arctic. While the long term 
effects of COVID-19 on oil markets are far from certain, the cratered demand and subsequent 
glut in supply will likely accelerate the shifting preference for tight oil and perhaps put the entire 
industry into decline much sooner than the EIA, IEA, or any other forecasts expected. The 
pandemic may bring or have already brought about peak oil, a sentiment the CEOs of BP and 
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Shell, among others, have echoed (Edwards & Hurst, 2020; Raval, 2020). Regardless of whether 
or not the world has hit peak oil, the industry will remain in disarray for some time. With oil 
prices at historically low levels, Alaska’s oil future has only become cloudier. 
Even if oil markets recover, one final and critical factor warrants discussion. A national 
climate change policy could have the greatest impact on Alaska’s oil production. Should former 
Vice President Joe Biden prevail in the upcoming presidential election, he would reverse course 
on President Trump’s irresponsible stance on climate action. Biden has called drilling in the 
Arctic a “disaster,” and his proposed climate policies include permanently closing the ANWR to 
oil and gas development along with calling for a global moratorium on Arctic offshore drilling 
(​Climate​, 2020; ​Joe Biden on the Arctic Refuge​, 2020). Further, he would reenter the United 
States into the Paris Climate Agreement and push for even greater emissions reductions 
(​Climate​, 2020). In order to most economically meet the 2ºC warming goal set in Paris, a study 
by McGlade and Ekins found that all Arctic oil and gas must be considered “unburnable” (2015). 
As a result, a shift in political leadership may have the most immediate and drastic effect on the 
Arctic’s energy future. 
The considerable uncertainty surrounding our future energy production and consumption 
leaves Alaska and the oil industry in a precarious position. The state will have to reshape its 
economy. Oil companies have already begun repositioning and rebranding themselves for a low 
carbon future. Risky Arctic oil projects no longer bring about lucrative returns. Rather they entail 
unnecessary environmental, economic, and reputational risk. In the global transition away from 
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